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IT IS a common belief that differences in farm land values de-
pend, in the long run, on farm earning power—except for
deviations due to amenities. The differences are regarded as
the result of a highly competitive land market, in which the
earnings potentials of the various grades of land are constantly
reappraised, the more productive properties then being bid up
and the less productive beaten down until the rates of return
are equalized.
Although that belief has many adherents on the long-run
theoretical level, it has few on the short-run practical level. In-
deed, the contrary belief is quite general, and farm income stud-
ies bear this out, that in the short run the rates of return on dif-
ferent grades of land within an area may be quite unequal. Lack
of adjustment between land values and income on different grades
of land within a type-of-farming area, combined with the
appraisal and lending practices of farm mortgage lenders be-
fore the thirties, is commonly accepted as the cause of the tradi-
tionally poor mortgage experience on the less productive land
in many parts of the United States during the interwar period.
But if deviations between market value and earnings value
are so clearly recognized, why do they persist, even in the short
run? Why do not the forces of competition come into play and
equalize the relation between earnings and market values on
all grades of land?
Imperfections of the Land Market
Probably the most important single factor preventing a more
precise adjustment of market values to earning powerinade-
quate knowledge of essential facts on the part of many land
buyers and mortgage lenders. This is most strikingly illustrated
in newly settled regions where buyers and lenders have to make
decisions without benefit of crop yield data, weather records, or
soil maps. As a result, serious mistakes may be made in apprais-
ing the productive potentiality of a whole region, and many
mistakes are almost certain to be made in appraising individual
properties. As experience accumulates, appraisals will improve,166MARKET VALUES AND OTHER FACTORS
but it is noteworthy that progress is often slow, particularly if
differences in farming returns within a region trace to causes
that are not readily apparent, such as local differences in climate
or internal soil drainage.
The process of adjusting market values to earning power may
also be retarded by customs or apathy. In northern Idaho, the
customary one-third share rental resulted in a price discrepancy
between the more productive and less productive lands in rela-
tion to earnings, the more productive land being undervalued.
Yet mere recognition of the price discrepancy apparently was
not sufficient to readjust land values as long as the rental sys-
tem persisted.
Another deterrent to a good adjustment between land values
and earnings on different grades of land within an area is social
and technological change, which creates new maladjustments
even while existing ones are being eliminated. The productivity
of land depends only partly on soils and climate;itis also
greatly affected by farming organization and practices—by the
crop and livestock systems used, by the insecticides and ferti-
lizers applied, and by the kind and amount of machinery em-
ployed. Financial returns from farming depend, moreover, not
only on physical productivity but also on price relationships and
markets, which frequently change. Over the past several dec-
ades we have seen important technological advances that have
increased the productivity and profitability of agri-
culture in general; yet the advances have not affected all farms
equally. Often technological advance operates to the disad-
vantage of some farms by giving other farms a competitive ad-
vantage. Population movements or widespread changes in the
demand for specific products may have the same effect.
Examples of the disorganizing effect that may sometimes be
exerted by rapid technological change on the agriculture of a
region are abundant. Among them are the development of rail-
road transportation in the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, which had an adverse effect on many types of farming in
the Northeast; the development of the automobile, which had
an adverse effect on commercial hay producers; and the inven-
tion of the cotton picker, which gave producers on the level,
high-yield lands of the Mississippi River delta an increased
competitive advantage over producers on the hilly eastern pied-
mont. Examples to illustrate the differential effects of techno-
logical change on individual farms within a type-of-farmingMARKET VALUES OTHER FACTORS167
area are not so easily found, although it is generally believed
that technological change rarely affects all farms in an area
equally. One such example is provided by the study of the
Newfane fruit area, discussed in the preceding chapter. There
was little evidence of variation in average rates of return for
Newfane farms according to their soil productivity, in either the
1913-19 or the 1920-29 period. But in 1930-39, after important
changes in technology and price-cost relationships, farmers on
the best adapted land were earning substantially higher rates
of return than other farmers. To do this, they were farming
the best grade of fruit land very intensively, and producing a
premium grade of fruit for specialty markets.
Limitations of capital are often cited as a cause of differences
in rates of return on different grades of farm land within type-
of-farming areas. Even in a relatively imperfect land market,
the more productive properties may sell at substantially higher
prices than the less productive ones. Those higher prices may
be insufficient to reflect the higher earning power of the pro-
ductive properties, and yet more than sufficient to discourage
purchasers with little capital. It is not enough for the prospec-
tive land buyer merely to recognize that a tract of exceptionally
well adapted land is underpriced, and therefore able to earn
a higher rate of return than the inferior tracts in the neighbor-
hood. He needs the wherewithal to make the purchase, and al-
though a portion of it can usually be borrowed, the remainder,
which may be large, will ordinarily have to be raised in the
form of cash. Hence, it is argued, the better-adapted land may
consistently sell for less in relation to earnings than the poor
land simply because there are relatively few buyers with suf-
ficient cash or credit to pay premium prices.
Amenities and Other Factors
Although imperfections of the farm mortgage and real estate
market no doubt account in part for the failure of market values
fully to reflect differences in the earning capacity of land, par-
ticularly within type-of-farming areas, it should not be over-
looked that people buy farms for many reasons other to
obtain a financial return. There are those who farm as an avoca-
tion, who buy farms for year-round or summer homes, who
practice subsistence or part-time farming, who seek independ-
ence or job security in a farm, or who are willing to forgo some
financial advantage to live in a congenial neighborhood with168MARKET VALUES AND OTHER FACTORS
good schools, churches, and other community facilities. As long
as persons buying farms for such purposes, and there are many
of them, have the necessary purchasing power to make their
demands effective, they can affect the market quite as distinctly
as do those who buy purely for investment. It would not be sur-
prising, therefore, to find that market values rarely equal earn-
ings values, even in the long run.
Market Values versus Earning Power
as Loan Security
The soundness of a long-term loan, whether a farm mortgage,
a business loan, or a corporate bond issue, ordinarily rests upon
two sources of financial security: first, the market value of the
collateral assets that can be seized in case of default or liquida-
tion; second, the earning power of the enterprise, which de-
termines its ability to meet interest charges and avoid default.
For years credit men have debated the relative importance of
these two sources of security, and in recent years emphasis has
shifted from assets toward earning power. The feeling has
strengthened that the assets of a business have value and com-
mand a price primarily because of their ability to earn a return.
Furthermore, the strategic value of the mortgage lien has been
limited by legal restrictions deterring creditors from taking
actual possession of assets. Bankruptcy courts have frequently
argued that the complete dissolution of a business, particularly
a railroad or other public utility, is contrary to the public in-
terest and have usually preferred to reorganize a company and
keep it in operation. Reorganization often prevents creditors
with prior liens, even first mortgage bondholders, from exer-
cising their rights of foreclosure. In much the same fashion,
moratorium legislation during the twenties and thirties pre-
vented many farm mortgage holders from foreclosing, and in
states where there was no such legislation, mass action by farm-
ers was often sufficient either to prevent foreclosure or to miti-
gate its effects.
There are, of course, many techniques of appraising farms for
loans, but almost all of them can be related to one of two basic
methods. One involves an estimate of capitalized earning power
—either current or average earnings, usually the latter—and
seeks to obtain the going-concern or investment value of the
farm. The other attempts to determine what the farm would
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needs, might involve an estimate of current selling price, forced-
sale price, selling price under an assumed level of farm prices
and business activity, or the long-term average selling price. In
any case the purpose is to ascertain the collateral or liquidation
value, rather than the going-concern value, of the property.
Many writers on farm finance appear to an appraisal
to do double duty: to reflect simultaneously both the liquida-
tion value and the going-concern value. If the capitalization and
market value methods produce different results, some average
or compromise value is taken, apparently with the idea that the
long-term going-concern value and the long-term liquidation
value are basically the same thing. That might be a reasonable
expectation if farms were bought and sold by thoroughly com-
petent and informed persons for the sole purpose of obtaining
a financial return. Actually, as has been pointed out, the land
market is far from perfect. Some buyers are well informed but
others are not, and the best informed are not necessarily the
ones with the greatest purchasing power. Moreover, regardless
of perspicacity or purchasing power, buyers buy for a multitude
of reasons. To some a farm is a strictly financial investment. As
landlords they may want an investment income from rentals
without taking an active part in the actual operation, or as
owner-operators they may want a fair investment return on their
capital in addition to a reasonable reward for their labor and
management. But there are many who are motivated by other
than purely financial considerations. Consequently, market
values rarely equal going-concern values, and a single estimate
cannot adequately reflect both.
In financial analyses of corporations and corporate securities,
it is quite common to make several evaluations in order to fit
possible contingencies. In the reorganization of a utility hold-
ing company, for example, several possibilities arise, and the
value of the company to those who own its stocks and bonds
varies accordingly. The company may consolidate and become
an operating company. It may become an investment trust, re-
linquishing control over its subsidiaries. It may sell its subsidi-
aries for cash, which it then pays out to its security holders. It
may distribute the actual stocks and bonds of its subsidiaries.
A farm., of course, presents fewer alternatives, but there are
still several possibilities. When a loan is closed, the lender hopes
that payments will be made regularly and that there will be
no other difficulties. Realization of his hopes is more likely ifI
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the farm has stable earnings adequate to cover the payments.
But since farming is an uncertain business, the lender must face
the possibilities of default and foreclosure, in spite of all ef-
forts to make loans that can be repaid. And if foreclosure does
occur, he faces two very different sets of alternatives for dealing
with the propehy. First, he may hold it as an income-producing
investment, either through rental or by operating it himself.
Second, he may sell it, either for cash or by extending a new
mortgage or sales contract. If the lender anticipates the first
contingency, he will certainly want an estimate of the income
that he will probably derive from operation; and he may or
may not capitalize the probable income to obtain a going-con-
cern value for the property itself. If, however, he anticipates the
second, he will need a market value appraisal. Some lenders
are able to choose whichever alternative appears more attrac-
tive. Others, however, are unable to hold the property for in-
come and must perforce sell it; and they will be vitally con-
cerned with the probable resale value. Evidently an appraisal
of market values is an important part of most loan analyses, re-
gardless of how the income account is appraised.
Relation of Loan to Long-term
Market Value
It is generally held, particularly by those who emphasize market
value appraisals, that the amount of a mortgage loan should be
substantially less than the long-term market value of the mort-
gaged property, taken either as a normal agricultural value or as
some other average of past or expected future market values.
The amount should be such that the property probably can be
sold under most circumstances for enough to cover the loan with
a margin to spare. The margin of safety protects the lender
against a number of contingencies: (i) The property may have
to be disposed of in a period of depressed prices. This is a com-
mon occurrence because land. values fluctuate widely at times
and most of the mortgage distress occurs when values are low.
(2) Often considerable time is required to foreclose a de-
linquent property and to find a suitable buyer for it. In the
interim there will be an accumulation of taxes, depreciation,
and maintenance expenses, which the lender will probably have
to assume; there will also be an accumulation of unpaid in-
terest.Inspite of care in making appraisals, a few properties
will have been overvalued and overgenerous loans extended.MARKET VALUES AND OTHER FACTORS171
The lender hopes that the safety factor will provide some cov-
erage for those loans. (4) Finally, the borrower derives a psycho-
logical impetus if he has a substantial amount of his own capital
tied up in the farm. Knowing that he may lose it if the farm has
to be sold in a bad market, he may be more inclined to thrift
and hard work.
The commonest device for providing such a margin of safety
is the limitation of loans to a stipulated percentage of appraised
market value. Although farm credit experts have thought much
about what constitutes the maximum safe ratio of loan to value,
opinions vary. Some lenders will extend a maximum loan of
not more than 50 percent of the appraised value. Some will lend
considerably more—say 75 percent. Many lenders vary the
maximum percentage according to the quality of the property.
One large institutional lender, for example, classifies farms in
five grades from A to E. The maximum loan on a Grade A farm
is ordinarily 6o percent; on a Grade D farm it is only 40 per-
cent. On a Grade E farm, or even a low D, no loan would
ordinarily be made. Sometimes the lender will vary the per-
centage to be loaned on land and buildings. Until recently, for
example, the federal land banks would lend 50 percent on land
but only 20 percent on buildings.
Varying opinions on the maximum safe loan-to-value ratio
may represent more than mere differences in judgment. Lend-
ing standards depend upon the lender's own specific require-
ments. What is suitable for one may be entirely unsuitable for
another. In the first place, since appraisal policies are not uni-
form, each lender must gear his lending standards to his ap-
praisal policy. To a limited extent, at least, conservative loan-
to-value ratios can compensate for liberal appraisals and vice
versa. A 6o percent loan on a liberal appraisal, for example,
might be the equivalent of a 75 percent loan on a conservative
appraisal. In the second place, lenders' ability to carry risk
varies. Because of liquidity requirements an institution like a
commercial bank may be unable to carry a delinquent borrower
through a period of general depression; and at the same time
it may incur serious losses if it forecloses and sells the property
while the land market is still weak. Such a lender must neces-
sarily pursue a more conservative policy than one with less need
for liquidity.
But the most important reason for variations in lending
standards is the wide geographical differences in lending risks,172MARKET VALUES AND OTHER FACTORS
which were discussed in Part I. In general, high risk areas like
the Great Plains will require more conservative loans than low
risk areas like the Northeast. Wherever farms are hard to sell,
or where land values fluctuate excessively, lenders are liable to
incur losses on foreclosures unless they limit their loans to an
exceptionally small percent of probable market value.
Earnings Coverage
In the study of farm income in Frederick county, discussed in
the preceding chapter, 0. H. White assumed that the maximum
possible loan was one for which interest and minimum amortiza-
tion charges could just be met by net cash income for 1938 less
estimated living expenses. If 1938 is considered a normal year,
that criterion would appear to provide no margin for safety.
In poorer years debt service charges could not be met out of
current earnings, except possibly by rigorously curtailing liv-
ing expenses; and a succession of poor years might produce
a cumulative deficit large enough to result in default.
It is difficult to determine, so many years later, how agricul-
tural prosperity in 1938 was appraised on the basis of informa-
tion then available. Clearly, 1938 was a depressed year for
industry, but the historical record of farm income suggests that
1938 may have been viewed as appro.aching normal for agricul-
ture. For the United States as a whole, net cash income of farm
operators in 1938 was $2.4 billion.' It was somewhat below
the prevailing level of the late twenties—$3.9 billion in 1925,
$3.8 billion in 1929—but it was much higher than 1932's $0.9
billion or the $1.4 and $i.6 billion received in 1931 and 1933
respectively. The period 1935-39 is often taken as a base for
agricultural calculations. For the United States, net cash income
of farm operators in that period averaged $2.7 billion, only
slightly above the 1938 amount.
In comparison with the subsequent era of farm prosperity,
however, 1938 might well be considered a conspicuously sub-
normal year. Its net cash income, $2.4 billion, has been ex-
ceeded in all subsequent years except 1940, when the total de-
clined somewhat to $2.3 billion, and in recent years has been
dwarfed by such records as $10.2 billion in 1946 and $ii.7
billion in A loan that was just covered in 1938 according
to White's standards would have been covered many times
1TheFarm Income Situation (Bureau of Agricultural Economics), August-
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over during those prosperous years_in fact, could probably have
been retired out of two or three years' income.
In corporation finance a substantial margin of safety is cus-
tomarily provided in calculating maximum debt loads. It is
commonly assumed that a corporation should be able to cover
interest charges out of current income in all years and have a
substantial margin to spare on the average. As a measure of the
safety margin, financial analysts often use the ratio
net operating income2
interest charges
called the times-fixed-charges-earned ratio. One well-known au-
thority states that this ratio, based on average net operating in-
come (before taxes) for seven to ten years, should be at least 4
for a public utility, 5 for a railroad, and 7foran industrial
corporation.5 If White had used any of those standards, his esti-
mates of the maximum permissible loan would have been great-
ly reduced.
The margin of safety provided by limiting loans to a fraction
of the apparent debt carrying capacity can serve two purposes.
First, it supplies a cushion to absorb normal variations in in-
come, which are probably as large in agriculture as in many
forms of corporate enterprise. Second, it gives some protection
against the ever present possibility of making an excessive loan
on the basis of an overestimate of long-term income. Although
variable payment mortgages, to be discussed later, are also capa-
ble of providing a cushion to absorb variations, they do not
give protection against basic overlending.
Adaptation of the principle of times-fixed-charges-earned from
corporation to agricultural finance will naturally require modi-
fications and adjustments. Most important, probably, is the ad-
justment for family living expenses. Off-farm work, unpaid
family labor, and amortization also deserve attention.
Adjustment for Living Costs
In corporate financial analysis, net operating income, which ap-
pears in the numerator of the times-fixed-charges-earned ratio,
is usually regarded as the amount available to meet interest
2 For definitions of net operating income and other technical terms used in
this chapter, see Appendix B.
8 B. J. Graham and D. L. Dodd, Security Analysis, third edition('95'), pp.
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charges.4 That is, interest charges constitute a claim against net
operating income that takes precedence over claims by the
stockholders for dividends or by the Treasury for income taxes.
For a family-sized proprietorship, such as a farm or a corner
grocery store, however, net operating income must be divided
between interest charges and family living expenses. Although
interest charges theoretically take precedence, many farm fi-
nancial experts take the view that family living costs, at least
those required for essentials, constitute in effect a first lien
against earnings; hence only income in excess of necessary liv-
ing costs can be considered available to meet mortgage interest.
Since estimates of farm family living costs are hard to make
and not abundantly available, the adjustment of farm income
for living costs presents difficulties. Most available estimates—
like those of the Bureau of Home Economics, used by White—
cover average actual rather than minimum living costs. For
farms in land class v, Frederick county, Maryland, average net
cash income was $3,450 and average living costs were estimated
at $1,398, leaving $2,052 for debt service. It is clear, however,
that individual family expenditures must have varied con-
siderably from the $1,398 average, and that many families
could, by reducing their actual expenditures, have commanded
larger sums with which to meet mortgage payments.
Adjustment for Off-farm Work
On small farms or part-time farms the income from strictly farm
operations is often a very poor indication of the capacity to re-
pay debt. If there is real or potential income from nonfarm
activities that can be used to help meet mortgage payments, it
should be taken into account. Indeed, many part-time farms
have no debt carrying capacity in terms of income from strictly
farming operations. Yet mortgage experience on such farms is
often good because off-farm income can be used to meet mort-
gage payments.
Adjustments for Unpaid Labor
Some analysts will argue that an adjustment for unpaid famil.y
labor, other than that of the operator, is quite as necessary as
the adjustment for living costs. Farms with a large number of
4Sometimesthere is additional, nonoperating income available to meet in-
terest charges. An example would be interest from securities owned by a manu-
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boys in the family may be capable of earning a high net operat-
ing income merely because of the large amount of unpaid labor.
As long as that situation continues, loan carrying capacity will
be high. But the boys may leave home, or the farm may pass
to a new owner without such a family. The accordingly dimin-
ished repayment capacity is more typical of the farm.
Adjustments for Amortization
When the loan contract stipulates amortization, which is now
common practice, the mortgagor must be able to meet the
interest charge plus an additional amount to retire the loan.
Although lenders may be more lenient about deferring the
amortization payment than the interest payment, failure to meet
either payment often constitutes a legal default.
The effect of the amortization requirement on earnings cover-
age is not entirely clear. At first it would appear that a cor-
respondingly larger income is required to cover the larger
combined payment. That is true when there is no provision for
deferring amortization; but with such a provision, expressed
or implied, the need for additional income is much less definite.
For example, a farm is estimated to earn $2,000 (net operat-
ing income) on the average, and family living expenses are
estimated at $1,200, with some leeway under pressure. Can
such a farm carry a $io,000 debt at 5 percent interest? The
annual interest charge of $500 without amortization is covered
4 times by net operating income, and i.6 times after allowance
for living costs. After interest and living expenses there is an
estimated margin of $300 under average conditions, and per-
haps $500 with some enforced economy in the home.
If, however, the contract requires level-payment amortiza-
tion in twenty years, annual charges would be $802, covered
2.5 times before allowance for living expenses and exactly once
after the allowance. Average income and expenditures would
provide no margin of safety, and enforced economy would pro-
vide only $200. With so small a margin, a default is more likely
with the amortized loan. But if a default occurs, particularly
after several years have elapsed, it will be less serious with the
amortized loan. At the end of ten years, for example, the prin-
cipal amount will have been reduced from $io,ooo to $6,193
and the interest payment proper from $500 to $310. If the
lender is willing to make adjustments, the principal payment of
$492 ($802 less $310) can possibly be deferred during a financial176MARKET VALUES AND OTHER FACTORS
emergency, or the loan can be refinanced on terms that will
reduce the borrower's annual burden. On a new thirty-year
loan, say, the total annual payments would be only $403, about
half the original $802.
In the early years of a long-term level-payment contract, an-
nual payments consist mainly of interest with very little amorti-
zation, and a generous adjustment of the type described above
is hardly feasible—unless the lender is willing to reduce the
interest rate or make the borrower an outright gift of part of
the principal. Suppose that the hypothetical farm family above
borrowed $13,100for35 years instead of $io,ooo for only 20
years. The larger, longer-term loan has the same annual pay-
ment of $802 as the other, but the annual amount of amortiza-
tion is much smaller, being only $147thefirst year as against
$302 for the $io,ooo 20-year loan. At that rate the farm family
would have to wait 25 years before the loan could be refinanced
on a new 30-year basis with payments reduced to $403.
The Variable Payment Mortgage
Some farm financial experts advocate variable payment mort-
gage contracts, according to which annual payments vary with
farm In poor years amortization of principal and even
interest could be skipped, in good years substantial prepay-
ments required. The land banks, without actually adopting
variable payment contracts, have achieved a somewhat similar
effect in practice. They extend to deserving borrowers privileges
of reducing or waiving payments in bad years, and they en-
courage farmers to make prepayments during prosperous years.
The variable payment mortgage is designed to adapt the
otherwise inflexible mortgage contract to the typically variable
incomes of agriculture. It offers the farmer a means of avoiding
embarrassment or in some cases disaster when his income falls
temporarily below its normal level. But the advantages of
variable payments cannot be realized unless long-term debt-
carrying capacity is conservatively estimated. According to a
recent publication, "Variable payments may serve to decrease
delinquency, but do not necessarily aid in paying off the loan;
that is, variable payments cannot be expected to compensate
for misjudgments in long-run debt-paying ability, for over-
5 See, for example, Improving Land Credit Arrangements in the Midwest (Pur-
due University Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 55', June 1950), pages
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lending,or for serious errors in appraisal. No system of varia-
ble payments can be expected to deal with the non-business
demands on farm income. Examples are heavy family expendi-
tures for medical purposes and decreases in income which result
from faulty management."6
Earnings Coverage, Loan-to-value Ratios,
and Rates of Return
When farm appraisals are made strictly according to the capitali-
zation method, a simple and direct relation exists between times-
fixed-charges-earned and the loan-to-value ratio. Suppose, for
example, that a lender's standards stipulate the following: ap-
praisals will be made by capitalizing the estimated net operat-
ing income atpercent; loans will be limited to 66 2/3 per-
cent of the appraised value; and interest will be at 5 percent.
This is equivalent to requiring that interest be covered at least
one and one half times according to the ratio
net operating income
interest charges
as is shown in Example A below:
Example A Example B Example CExample D
Net operating income $1,000 $1,000 $i,ooo $1,000
Capitalizationrate 5% 5% 6% 5%
Appraised value (capitali-
zation basis) $20,000 $20,000 $16,667 $20,000
Maximumloan ratio 66 2/3% 50% 662/3% 662/3%
Maximumloan $13,333 $io,00o $11,111 $13,333
Interest rate 5% 5% 5% 4%
Annual interest charge $667 $500 $556 $533
Times-fixed-charges-earned 1.5 2.0 i.8 1.9
ExamplesB, C, and D show that greater interest coverage can
be achieved if the maximum loan-to-value ratio is reduced, say,
to 50percent;or if the capitalization rate is increased, say, to
6 percent; or if the interest rate is lowered, say, to 4 percent.
When farm appraisals are based partly or wholly on market
comparisons, rates of return usually vary from farm to farm,
exerting a considerable influence on earnings coverage. In the
table below, five hypothetical farms are appraised at $20,000
each (basis, long-term market value):
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Examples Showing the Effect of Profitability
on Earnings Coverage
Farm AFarm BFarm CFarm DFarm E
Appraised market value$20,000$20,000$20,000$20,000$20,000
Return on real estate
investment $i,ooo $1,200 $1,200 $1,200 $2,000
Rate of return 5% 6% 6% 6% io%
Loan-to-value ratio 66.7% 66.7% 6o.o% 50.0% 66.7%
Amount of loan $13,333$12,000$10,000$13,333
Interest rate 5% 5% 5% 4% 5%
Interest charge $667 $667 $6oo $400 $667
Times-fixed-charges-earned 1.5 i.8 2.0 3.0 3.0
Farm A is assumed to have a somewhat poorer soil than the
others; but it has a larger and better farm dwelling, which suf-
fices to equalize market values. Thus Farm A earns only 5
percent on appraised value, or $i,ooo; whereas Farms B, C,
and D earn $1,200, or 6 percent. Farm E earns io percent
through a combination of better-than-average soil and manage-
ment. The farm dwelling, however, is somewhat below com-
munity standards, and the market value of the farm isesti-
mated to be $20,000.
As between Farms A and B, the only difference is in the rates
of return, which give a slightly better times-fixed-charges-earned
coverage for Farm B; the loan-to-value ratios are the same.
Farm C has a dual advantage over Farm A. Not only is it more
profitable, but the loan-to-value ratio is lower; hence Farm
C is carrying a smaller interest burden with a bigger income.
Farm D has a still lower loan-to-value ratio and a lower rate
of interest. The result of that combination is a times-fixed-
charges-earned ratio of 3.0—just twice that of Farm A. To pro-
duce a comparable coverage on Farm A would require a loan-
to-value ratio of 33 1/3 percent instead of 66 2/3 percent. Farm
E also covers its interest three times; but that is due solely to
the extraordinarily high rate of return, for Farm E has the same
size of loan and the same interest burden as Farm A.
The foregoing examples indicate that good interest coverage
can be achieved either through an ultraconservative loan or
through a rate of return substantially higher than the mortgage
interest rate. Thus it is clear why farm mortgage lenders prefer
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a substantial down payment on his farm or otherwise acquires
a substantial equity, giving assurance of a conservative loan;
second, the man who buys his farm at a bargain price in terms
of its earning capacity and finances it on a conventional basis;
and third, the man who is an uncommonly efficient operator.
The third type, of course, involves some risk, for the efficient
operator may die or sell out and be replaced by someone who is
less efficient.